Voting

Mechanism · VIII – Cooperation & Agreement immediate · irreversible · open / concealed · cooperative / competitive / asymmetric

Voting makes collective, binding decisions: a voting procedure aggregates individual preferences into a group decision – shaping strategic behaviour.

Design question – How does a group in your game make a collective, binding decision?

Reference example – Werewolf (Social Deduction) · Secret Hitler (Policy Voting) · Republic Of Rome (Collective Decision)

Structural pattern

Input -> transformation -> output: individual preferences (votes) become a collective decision (group decision) via a voting procedure (aggregation).

Regulated in permitting mode (who may vote; veto rights), constraining mode (open or secret; weighted votes) and conditioning mode (which majority decides: simple, qualified, unanimous; what applies in a tie; whether the result binds). In a game, vote weights and quorums become specifications.

Design parameters

• Mode – open ↔ secret/sequential
• Majority rule – simple majority ↔ unanimity
• Vote weight – equal ↔ veto-based
• Tactical voting – impossible ↔ central element
• Object – person ↔ resource distribution
• Frequency – one-off ↔ constant

Related Mechanisms

• Communication (MEC-16) – Frequently combined: discussion before the vote.
• Deduction (MEC-17) – Frequently combined: tactical voting.
• Negotiation (MEC-26) – Frequently combined: trade votes.
• Role Assignment (MEC-32) – Frequently combined: role-dependent voting rights.

Ludic Organisational Structures

Democracy / Voting System (core) · Commons (dynamic)